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ORIGINAL RESEARCH REPORT
Do Reward-Related Distractors Impair Cognitive 
Performance? Perhaps Not
Dorottya Rusz*, Erik Bijleveld† and Michiel A. J. Kompier†
Over a hundred prior studies show that reward-related distractors capture attention. It is less clear, 
however, whether and when reward-related distractors affect performance on tasks that require cognitive 
control. In this experiment, we examined whether reward-related distractors impair performance during 
a demanding arithmetic task. Participants (N = 81) solved math problems, while they were exposed to 
task-irrelevant stimuli that were previously associated with monetary rewards (vs. not). Although we 
found some evidence for reward learning in the training phase, results from the test phase showed no 
evidence that reward-related distractors harm cognitive performance. This null effect was invariant across 
different versions of our task. We examined the results further with Bayesian analyses, which showed 
positive evidence for the null. Altogether, the present study showed that reward-related distractors did 
not harm performance on a mental arithmetic task. When considered together with previous studies, the 
present study suggests that the negative impact of reward-related distractors on cognitive control is not 
as straightforward as it may seem, and that more research is needed to clarify the circumstances under 
which reward-related distractors harm cognitive control.
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The prospect of earning rewards, such as monetary 
rewards, has a profound tendency to boost people’s 
performance (Botvinick & Braver, 2015). Indeed, when 
rewards can be earned, people learn faster (Le Pelley, 
Mitchell, Beesley, George, & Wills, 2016), invest more 
effort (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000), and generally perform 
better on cognitive tasks (Padmala & Pessoa, 2011). At first 
sight, it thus seems that rewards consistently facilitate 
performance during cognitive tasks. Intriguingly, however, 
research has also identified some specific circumstances 
under which rewards harm, not help, performance. 
For instance, smelling some delicious food during work 
at the office means that rewards are near, but these 
rewards do not necessarily improve performance on the 
task one is currently working on. In this research, we will 
examine how reward cues that are not directly related 
to the current task (i.e., reward-related distractors) affect 
cognitive performance.
Prior research has extensively studied how reward-
related distractors grab people’s attention during 
visual search (for reviews, see Anderson, 2016a; Failing 
& Theeuwes, 2017). Typically, in these studies (e.g., 
Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011), participants first go 
through a learning phase, in which they learn to associate 
some stimulus (e.g., a red circle) with earning money (e.g., 
5 cents). Later, in a testing phase, participants perform a 
search task (i.e., they have to search for a target), while 
the previously rewarded stimulus (e.g., the red circle) 
re-appears as a task-irrelevant stimulus (i.e., as a distractor). 
These studies showed that distractors that were associated 
with high reward captured visual attention more than 
distractors associated with low (or no) reward, and thus 
slowed down search for the targets (e.g., Anderson et al., 
2011; Bucker, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2014; Le Pelley, 
Pearson, Griffiths, & Beesley, 2015). In other words, these 
studies support the idea that reward-related irrelevant 
cues can harm cognitive processes.
Although previous studies demonstrate that reward-
related distractors have a strong impact on visual attention 
(e.g., where people direct their eye-movements), less is 
known about whether reward-related distractors have 
broader cognitive and behavioral consequences. That 
is, in daily life at work and school, most tasks require 
complex interactions with information, not merely a 
search for target stimuli. In these contexts, optimal 
performance, for instance giving correct answers during 
an exam, giving a clear presentation, or constructively 
contributing to a staff meeting, relies on cognitive control 
processes. Cognitive control refers to the maintenance and 
adaptive regulation of thoughts and behavior in pursuit 
of internally represented behavioral goals (Braver, 2012). 
If reward-related distractors disrupt control processes, 
beyond visual attention, then being exposed to these 
reward-related distractors may turn out to be especially 
harmful to outcomes in work and educational settings. 
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So, in the current study, we investigated whether reward-
related distractors indeed harm performance during a task 
that requires cognitive control (i.e., a mental arithmetic 
task).
On the one hand, one might suspect that although 
reward-related distractors disrupt early cognitive processes 
(e.g., attentional shifts that occur before 150 ms; Posner, 
Inhoff, Friedrich, & Cohen, 1987), they may not affect 
later processing stages (e.g., that occur after 150 ms). 
Support for this idea comes from a study by Theeuwes and 
Belopolsky (2012), who investigated how reward-related 
distractors impact eye movements. In their experiment, 
participants had to move their gaze to a certain target 
as fast as possible (i.e., oculomotor capture task). 
While doing so, stimuli appeared that were previously 
associated with reward, but were now unrelated to the 
task. Findings showed that participant’s gaze was rapidly 
captured by reward-related distractors (e.g., saccades to 
the direction of reward-related distractors), but after this 
initial capture, people could readily disengage. The authors 
concluded that rewards seem to increase the salience of 
a cue, and therefore capture attention rapidly, but that 
rewards are less likely to influence processes after this 
attentional capture (see also Failing, Nissens, Pearson, Le 
Pelley, & Theeuwes, 2015; Le Pelley, Seabrooke, Kennedy, 
Pearson, & Most, 2017; Maclean & Giesbrecht, 2015). Along 
similar lines, a recent meta-analysis showed that positive 
emotional cues – regardless of task relevance – capture 
attention rapidly and have stronger impact during early 
(rather than later) stages of processing (Pool, Brosch, 
Delplanque, & Sander, 2015). Thus, if reward cues have 
similar effects to positive emotional cues, one could 
argue that reward-related distractors impact performance 
on tasks, in which performance is mainly dependent on 
early processes (e.g., visual search), but not on tasks that 
mainly require cognitive control processes (e.g., active 
maintenance of goal-relevant cues).
On the other hand, some studies do suggest that reward-
related distractors do not just affect visual attentional 
capture (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2012; Failing & 
Theeuwes, 2015; MacLean, Diaz, & Giesbrecht, 2016; 
Munneke, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2016; Munneke, 
Hoppenbrouwers, & Theeuwes, 2015; Wang, Duan, 
Theeuwes, & Zhou, 2014) and that they may impair 
cognitive control processes. Support from this latter idea 
comes from Krebs and colleagues (2010), who found 
that distractors associated with reward disrupted conflict 
processing in a Stroop task (see also: Krebs, Boehler, 
Appelbaum, & Woldorff, 2013; Krebs, Boehler, Egner, & 
Woldorff, 2011). Specifically, in this prior study, some ink 
colors (e.g., red) were associated with monetary reward. 
When these stimuli appeared as distractors (in this case, 
as the semantic meaning of the word; e.g., the word “red” 
presented in yellow), they slowed down people’s responses 
in the Stroop task, more so than distractors not associated 
with reward. Along similar lines, another study showed 
that distractors that are associated with strong emotions, 
disrupt control processes during working memory 
maintenance (Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006). Taken together, 
it seems plausible that reward-related distractors first 
attract visual attention (Anderson et al., 2011; Le Pelley 
et al., 2015; Theeuwes & Belopolsky, 2012). Then, in turn, 
these distractors are more likely to permeate into working 
memory (Gong & Li, 2014; Klink, Jeurissen, Theeuwes, 
Denys, & Roelfsema, 2017), which eventually causes 
people to have less capacity left to carry out task-relevant 
processes, hence leading to worse performance on the task.
To test the latter possibility, we previously carried out two 
experiment (reported in Rusz, Bijleveld, & Kompier, 2018). 
In these experiments, we tested whether reward-related 
distractors could harm performance on a demanding 
math task, and whether this putative distraction effect 
was moderated by people’s current motivational states. 
In these previous experiments, participants first learned 
to associate different colors with high vs. no monetary 
rewards. Later, in the test phase, participants had to 
solve math problems. While they worked on these 
problems, the colors associated with high vs. no reward 
reappeared as distractors. To examine the effect of current 
motivational states, on some trials during the math task, 
participants could earn money for responding accurately. 
Findings from these previous studies were inconclusive. 
In particular, the first experiment showed that reward-
related distractors harmed performance regardless of 
motivational states, but we could not directly replicate 
this effect in the second experiment. So, if anything, these 
previous studies yielded weak evidence for reward-based 
distraction on math tasks.
A possible explanation for why these prior studies yielded 
only weak evidence, is that we manipulated people’s current 
motivational state in these prior studies (i.e., participants 
could earn money on some trials). A side-effect of this 
manipulation may have been that it increased participants’ 
general motivation throughout the math task, which may 
have made distraction less likely altogether (Müller et al., 
2007). Thus, in the present study, we further investigated 
whether reward-related distractors can harm people’s 
performance on a math task. However, this time, we took 
a step back, and we did not manipulate people’s current 
motivational state. Instead, we focused solely on testing 
the reward-based distraction effect.
In particular, we predicted that distractors that were 
previously associated with reward (vs. no reward) harm 
cognitive performance. If we find support for this 
hypothesis, it would mean that reward-related distractors 
are capable of disrupting not just visual search (i.e., quick 
saccades away from goal-relevant information, that are 
corrected immediately), but, in turn, may have more 
severe consequences for subsequent cognitive processes.
Present research
To test our hypothesis, we used our original paradigm 
(Rusz et al., 2018) – without the motivation manipulation 
in the test phase – which was originally designed based on 
research on value-driven attention (Anderson et al., 2011) 
and on research on distraction during math performance 
(Beilock et al., 2004; Beilock & Carr, 2005). First, in a 
training phase, participants learned to associate earning 
high vs. no monetary rewards with two different colors. 
Later, in a test phase, participants performed a mental 
arithmetic task (they had to add up four numbers), while 
the previously rewarded colors reappeared as distractors. 
Art. 10, page 3 of 13Rusz et al: Do Reward-Related Distractors Impair Performance?
So, participants had to prioritize the arithmetic task, 
while ignoring distractors, even though these were 
sometimes associated with reward. As simple mental 
additions can take up to 800–900 ms (Ashcraft, 1992; 
Ashcraft & Battaglia, 1978), we expected that the rather 
fast presentation of the numbers (700 ms per number) 
would make it especially difficult to perform these mental 
additions while trying to ignore distractors. Therefore, 
we expected that distractors associated with reward (vs. 
no reward) will disrupt cognitive performance, which we 
operationalized as the percentage of accurate responses.
To explore the circumstances under which reward-
based disruption – if we can detect it at all – is strongest, 
we designed three variations of our task described 
above. In these variations, we tested whether distractors 
associated with reward impede cognitive performance 
more when they were previously always associated with 
rewards (Experiment 1A) vs. when they were randomly 
associated with rewards on 80% of trials (Experiment 1B), 
or when they were located further away from task-relevant 
cues (Experiment 1C).
Method
Preregistration and data availability
We preregistered our study on AsPredicted (https://
aspredicted.org/3j7gw.pdf). Unless otherwise noted, 
inclusion criteria and statistical analyses were pre-
registered. The experimental task, data, and analysis scripts 
can be found via https://osf.io/dwa89/. This research was 
approved by the Ethics Committee of the Social Science 
Faculty (ECSW2017-0805-50).
Participants
Participants were 90 students from Radboud University. 
We recruited fluent Dutch speakers, who were 25 years 
old or younger, slept at least 6 hours the night before 
the experiment, and were not colorblind. After data 
collection, 2 participants nevertheless reported to have 
slept less than 6 hours, so they were excluded from the 
final analysis. Moreover, we excluded 7 participants who 
performed below 60% accuracy. The final sample consisted 
of 81 students (27 participants per task variation; 59 
females and 22 males; Mage = 22.35 years, SDage = 1.96). 
Participants received compensation in cash based on their 
performance (maximum 6 €).
Procedure
Participants were seated in a cubicle in front of a 
computer. First, participants gave their written informed 
consent to participate in the study. Next, they reported 
their demographics (age, sex), hours of sleep the night 
before, and their need for money on a 1 (not at all) to 
7 (very much) scale (“To what extent are you in need 
for money at the moment?”). Afterwards, they carried 
out the task (see below). Then, they reported how 
motivated they were, and how demanding and difficult 
they felt the task was on a 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) 
scale. Finally, they filled out the Dutch version of the 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11; Patton, Stanford, 
& Barratt, 1995; see Table 1 for descriptive statistics of 
all subjective measures). We collected these subjective 
measures in order to explore whether current states and 
traits affect reward-based distraction (based on results 
of Anderson et al., 2011). The experiment took around 
35–40 minutes to finish. At the end, participants were 
thanked, paid, and debriefed.
General overview of the task
The task consisted of two parts, a training and a testing 
phase. In the training phase (see Figure 1), participants 
first saw a fixation cross, then four times a number + 
letter combination presented one after each other (e.g., 
8W, X5, 9Y, and Z7; see Figure 1). Their task was to report 
whether the letters were in the correct alphabetical order 
(e.g., W, X, Y, Z). They responded by pressing “Q” for correct 
and “P” for incorrect trials. On half of the trials, one of 
the letters had a different color. If this letter was blue 
(or red, counterbalanced across all participants, N = 90), 
participants could earn a monetary reward (8 cents). If 
it was red (or blue, counterbalanced), participants could 
earn no monetary reward. On no-reward trials (e.g., red), 
responses were followed by visual feedback indicating 
“Good” or “False”. High-reward trials (e.g., blue) were 
additionally followed by reward feedback (+ 8 cents) and 
the total amount that has been earned during the task 
so far. Participants were not informed about the reward 
contingency beforehand. In total, participants completed 
4 practice trials and 150 training trials.
In the test phase (see Figure 2), participants saw 
a fixation cross and four times a number + letter 
combination presented one after each other (e.g., 8W, 
X5, 9Y, and Z7), and lastly, a two-digit number that was 
+/–1 to the sum of these numbers (e.g., 28). Their task 
was to add up the four numbers and report whether the 
sum of the presented numbers (e.g., 8 + 5 + 9 + 7 = 29) 
was higher or lower than the number presented in the 
last display (e.g., 28). They responded by pressing “Q” 
for smaller and “P” for larger sums (29 is bigger than 
28, so the correct response would be “P”). Identical to 
the training phase, on half of the trials, one letter was 
always red and the other half of the trials one letter was 
always blue. In this case, the letters served as distractors, 
previously associated with monetary (vs. no monetary) 
rewards. Importantly, because the spatial location of the 
distractor (left vs. right) was randomized, participants 
could not predict the location of the distractor, which 
made distractors difficult to ignore. In total, participants 
completed 10 practice and 64 test trials.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Subjective Measures.
Subjective Measures M SD Range
Sleep 7.72 .73 3.5
Task demands 5.17 1.5 6
Task difficulty 4.06 1.66 6
Fatigue 4.48 1.57 6
Motivation 5.35 1.18 6
BIS 2.07 .32 1.47
Need for money 4.33 1.52 6
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Task variations
As mentioned above, we designed three variations of 
the experiment (between-subject factor), to which we 
randomly assigned participants (N = 30/variation). 
All three variations were in line with the general 
task description above, with only slight differences. 
In Experiment 1A, reward contingency in the training 
phase was 100%. That is, high-reward distractors were 
previously associated with earning money on all trials. 
To test whether a variable ratio schedule (Thorndike, 
Figure 1: Training phase. Example of (A) no reward and (B) high reward trials.
Figure 2: Testing phase. Example trial with a distractor associated with (A) no rewards and with (B) high rewards.
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1898) makes the hypothesized disruption effect stronger, 
Experiment 1B used an 80%–20% reward contingency. 
That is, high-reward distractors were previously associated 
with earning money on 80% of the trials (vs. all trials). 
Finally, Experiment 1C was identical to Experiment 
1A with one difference: both in the training and test 
phases, target (e.g., 8) and distractor (e.g., W) were located 
spatially further away from each other (8.5 mm vs. 34.2 
mm difference between target and distractor/1680 × 
1050 display). In this version, the goal was to test whether 
reward-based disruption is stronger when it takes longer 
to direct eye movements from distractor (e.g., red colored 
W) to target (e.g., 8). If indeed eye movements are rapidly 
captured by reward-related distractors, it should take 
longer to direct attention back to task relevant cues 
(Henderson & Macquistan, 1993; Laberge & Brown, 
1986; Shulman, Wilson, & Sheehy, 1985), which may 
result in even worse performance on the math task (for 
an alternative perspective, see Gaspar & McDonald, 2014; 
Hickey & Theeuwes, 2011).
Results
Training phase analyses (not pre-registered)
We should note that we did not preregister these analyses; 
thus, these results should be interpreted with caution. 
As we had no a priori hypotheses about the learning 
phase, we mainly rely on effect sizes when we interpret 
the results (Forstmeier, Wagenmakers, & Parker, 2017; 
Greenland et al., 2016; Nosek, Ebersole, DeHaven, & 
Mellor, 2018). Additionally, the p-values that are related 
to exploratory analyses in this paper are not corrected for 
multiple comparisons.
In order to examine reward learning, we ran a GLM 
analysis with reward (high vs. no) and block (first vs. 
second) as independent variables, separately for accuracy 
and response time (RT) as dependent variables. Based on 
prior research (e.g., Anderson, 2016b; Sha & Jiang, 2016), 
the first goal of this analysis was to explore whether 
participants are more accurate and/or faster when 
there is a reward (vs. no reward)-predictive color in the 
sequence. In line with analyses from previous studies 
(Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2014; Bourgeois, Neveu, 
Bayle, & Vuilleumier, 2015; Failing & Theeuwes, 2015), 
the second goal was to test whether this difference would 
change over time. More specifically, if there is a difference 
in responses to reward predictive vs. non-predictive trials, 
this difference should be especially pronounced by the 
end of the training phase (e.g., in the second block) – when 
participants had enough time to pick up on stimulus-
reward associations. We ran our GLM, first, on the whole 
sample and second, separately for each experiment. 
Results are summarized in Table 2 and Figure 3a–d.
Inspection of Table 2 shows that high (vs. no) reward 
predictive colors did not influence accuracy or RT when 
considering the pooled data from all experiments. 
When examining the experiments separately, however, 
we found that reward learning seemed more pronounced 
in Experiment 1A and Experiment 1B (80–20% random 
reward) compared to Experiment 1C (increased distance). 
In Experiment 1A, participants seemed to be more accurate 
on high-reward trials, though this was not accompanied 
by faster response times. In Experiment 1B, participants 
became faster in the second half of the experiment, 
particularly on high-reward trials, but they did not become 
more accurate. So, while there were indications of reward 
learning in both Experiments 1A and 1B, these indications 
were not entirely consistent.
We further explored whether task-related subjective 
measures (motivation, difficulty, demands), current states 
(need for money, fatigue), and trait impulsivity were related 
Table 2: Analyses of the learning phase.
Accuracy RT
All experiments dfs F p ηp
2 F p ηp
2
1. Reward 1,80 2.79 .098 .03 <1 .478 <.01
2. Block 1,80 2.55 .115 .03 2.98 .088 .04
3. Reward × Block 1,80 <1 .646 <.01 <1 .983 <.01
Experiment 1A
1. Reward 1,26 2.91 .099 .10 .22 .641 .01
2. Block 1,26 2.08 .160 .07 1.15 .293 .04
3. Reward × Block 1,26 2.47 .127 .09 3.10 .089 .101
Experiment 1B
1. Reward 1,26 .04 .527 .02 .02 .875 <.01
2. Block 1,26 1.49 .232 .05 9.27 .005 .26
3. Reward × Block 1,26 8.91 .006 .26 5.29 .029 .17
Experiment 1C
1. Reward 1,26 .33 .568 .01 .85 .364 .03
2. Block 1,26 .04 .842 <.01 .15 .701 .01
3. Reward × Block 1,26 <1 .957 <.01 .10 .753 <.01
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Figure 3: (a) Accuracy scores and response times in high and no reward predictive trials in the first and second block of 
the training phase in all experiments. (b) Accuracy scores and response times in high and no reward predictive trials 
in the first and second block of the training phase in Experiment 1A. (c) Accuracy scores and response times in high 
and no reward predictive trials in the first and second block of the training phase in Experiment 1B. (d) Accuracy 
scores and response times in high and no reward predictive trials in the first and second block of the training phase 
in Experiment 1C.
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to performance in the training phase. We found that trait 
impulsivity was negatively related to accuracy scores on 
reward predictive trials (r = –.34, p = .002). It could be 
that for participants who score high on this trait, reward 
predictive colors triggered some impulsive responses that 
were less likely to be accurate. Furthermore, self-reported 
motivation was positively related to accuracy scores 
in both no-reward (r = .26, p = .017), and high-reward 
conditions (r = .37, p < .001). All other correlations were 
not significant (ps > .05).
Main analyses (pre-registered)
Responses that were three standard deviations faster 
or slower than the participant’s mean and responses 
faster than 300 ms (which were considered guesses) 
were deleted, which resulted in the exclusion of 1.4% 
of trials. To test our hypothesis, we performed a GLM 
analysis with the reward value of the distractor (high 
vs. no) as a within-subject independent variable, and 
accuracy scores (percentage of correct responses) as the 
dependent variable. There was no significant difference 
in accuracy scores between high vs. no distractor reward 
trials, F(1,80) = 0.26, p = .608, ηp
2 = .00. Thus, contrary to 
our hypothesis, we found no evidence that reward-related 
distractors impede cognitive performance.
To test whether different task variations had any 
effect on performance in high (vs. no) reward distractor 
trials (see Table 3 for descriptive statistics), we ran the 
same GLM as before, now adding task variation as a 
between subject factor. Crucially, the distractor reward 
× task variation interaction was also not significant, 
F(2,78) = 0.15, p = .864, ηp
2 = .00. To conclude, we did 
not find evidence that reward-related distractors harm 
more when reward contingency is random (no difference 
between Experiment 1A and Experiment 1B) and when 
the distractor is located further away from the target 
(Experiment 1C).
To further explore these null results, visually inspecting 
individual accuracy scores in high vs. no reward 
distractor conditions might be helpful. Figure 4 shows 
each participants’ difference score (i.e., high-reward 
accuracy minus no-reward accuracy scores) across task 
variations. A difference score below 0 would mean that 
our manipulation worked, that is, participants had lower 
accuracy (i.e., performed worse) in the high-reward 
distractor condition. When inspecting Figure 4, it is clear 
that participants did not clearly score below 0.
As a secondary analysis, we tested whether high (vs. no) 
reward-related distractors had an impact on people’s 
speed. To this end, we ran another GLM with distractor 
reward (high vs. no) as within subject independent variable 
and RT as dependent variable. We found no significant 
difference in RTs between high vs. no distractor reward 
trials, F(1,80) = 0.90, p = .346, ηp
2 = .01. The distractor 
value × task variation interaction was not significant 
either, F(2,78) = 0.57, p = .563, ηp
2 = .01. In sum, we found 
no evidence that reward-related distractors slow down 
people’s responses on a math task.
Bayesian analyses (not pre-registered)
To provide more conclusive evidence for this null effect, we 
tested our predictions with a Bayesian approach (Dienes, 
2014) in JASP (JASP Team, 2018). A Bayesian paired-samples 
t-test with distractor reward (high vs. no) as independent 
and accuracy scores as dependent variable yielded a 
BF01 = 6.68, which is considered moderate evidence for 
the null hypothesis (see Figure 5A). Another Bayesian 
paired-samples t-test with distractor reward (high vs. no) 
as independent variable and RTs as dependent variable 
also showed moderate evidence for the null hypothesis, 
i.e., BF01 = 5.26 (see Figure 5B). In sum, these results 
strengthen findings from our preregistered analyses: they 
directly support the idea that reward-related distractors do 
not harm cognitive performance.
To test whether different task variations had an effect 
on performance in high (vs. no) reward distractor trials, we 
ran a Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA with distractor 
reward and task variation as independent variables, and 
separately for accuracy and RTs as dependent variables. 
The distractor reward × task variation interaction on 
accuracy as dependent variable yielded a BF01 = 91.29 – and 
on RTs as dependent variable yielded a BF01 = 52.68. 
These results show strong evidence against the idea that 
different task variations moderated performance in high 
vs. no distractor reward trials.
Further exploratory analyses (not pre-registered)
We explored whether task-related measures (motivation, 
difficulty, demands), current states (need for money, 
fatigue), and trait impulsivity were related to the amount 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Accuracy and Response Times in High vs. No Distractor trials in All Task Variations.
Accuracy (percentage of correct responses)
Experiment 1A Experiment 1B Experiment 1C
Within-subject condition M SD M SD M SD
No reward-related distractor 81.2% 11% 84.4% 13.9% 82.3% 12.2%
Reward-related distractor 80.7% 12% 84.5% 12.6% 81.0% 10.9%
Response Times (ms)
M SD M SD M SD
No reward-related distractor 2141 1699 1559 920 2113 2108
Reward-related distractor 2141 1683 1571 1088 2210 2380
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of reward-related capture (calculated as RT when a high-
reward distractor was present minus RT when no-reward 
distractor was present; based on Anderson et al., 2011). 
Difficulty was positively related to the amount of reward-
related capture (r = .25, p = .028). This implies that the 
more difficult one felt like the task was, the more they 
got distracted (i.e., in this case, became slower) from high 
reward distractors. Other correlations were not significant 
(ps > .05).
Finally, we further explored whether performance in 
the training phase was related to the distractor effects in 
the test phase. For this purpose we computed a reward 
learning score for each participant (i.e., the difference 
between RTs on no vs. high reward trials on the first part 
of the training phase minus the difference between no 
vs. high reward trials on the second part of the training 
phase). The higher the score is, the bigger the RT 
difference in between no vs. high reward predictive trials 
in the second vs. the first phase of the learning phase 
and, thus, the more successful reward learning. This 
reward learning score was not related to the amount of 
reward-related capture (r = .06, p = .58); thus, we found 
no evidence for a relationship between reward learning 
and reward-based distraction.
Figure 4: Difference scores for accuracy, for all task variations. Negative difference scores indicate that people  performed 
worse during high-reward distractor trials. Small, blue dots reflect mean difference scores for individual participants. 
Large, black dots reflect mean differences scores for all participants. Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals 
around the group means.
Figure 5: Sequential Bayesian analysis separately for (A) accuracy and for (B) RT. The plot shows whether the observa-
tions coming in sequence (i.e., as N grows) are in favour of the null (BF01 > 1) or the alternative hypotheses (BF01 < 1), 
as. Inspection of Figure 5 suggests that there is moderate evidence for the null hypotheses, i.e., that reward-related 
distractors do not harm cognitive performance. As BF01 does not grow towards the direction of the null hypothesis 
after reaching N = ~30, it becomes clear that we would have gotten evidence for the null hypothesis after collecting 
approximately 30 participants in total.
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Note: in our previous paper, in Experiment 2, we found 
that reward-related distractors impaired performance 
only when they appeared early vs. late during the trial. 
To be consistent, we performed that same analysis (GLM 
with distractor reward and timing as within subject 
independent measures and accuracy as dependent 
measure) on the current data too. This analysis yielded no 
meaningful effect (F < 1). This means that unlike in our 
previous study (Rusz et al., 2018), distractor timing did not 
moderate reward-based distraction.
Discussion
The goal of the present research was to test whether 
reward-related distractors harm cognitive performance. 
Participants first learned to associate reward (vs. no 
reward) to different colors in the training phase via a 
deterministic (Experiment 1A and 1C) or a random reward 
schedule (Experiment 1B). After, they performed a math 
task, which involved difficult operations (e.g., the active 
maintenance and updating of task-relevant information), 
while they were exposed to reward-related, but task-
irrelevant cues. Task-irrelevant and task-relevant stimuli 
appeared spatially close together (Experiments 1A and 1B) 
or far apart (Experiment 1C).
Our main confirmatory test suggested that being 
exposed to reward-related distractors do not necessarily 
thwart cognitive performance on a mental arithmetic task. 
This finding is unexpected, given that a large body of prior 
work showed that reward-related distractors do capture 
visual attention (e.g., Anderson et al., 2011; Bucker & 
Theeuwes, 2017; Le Pelley et al., 2015). Furthermore, this 
finding is not fully in line with our own previous findings 
on math performance. In particular, in our previous study 
(Rusz et al., 2018), we found only weak evidence for reward-
driven distraction; in the current study, we found evidence 
against reward-based distraction. Although the current 
study’s method was somewhat different from the studies 
in Rusz et al. (2018), the studies collectively suggest that 
reward-related distractors do not harm math performance. 
Now, we will discuss three possible explanations for 
finding evidence against our hypothesized effect.
First, it is plausible that reward-related distractors 
simply have no influence on task performance that 
relies on cognitive control processes. As discussed in the 
introduction, the rapid visual capture effect of reward-
related cues may deteriorate in later processing stages. 
Supporting this possibility, Theeuwes and Belopolsky 
(2012) showed that distractors associated with reward 
rapidly captured visual attention (i.e., saccades), but did not 
affect eye movements after this capture. Along these lines, 
recent research showed that reward-related distractors 
more likely influence early (vs. late) stages of visual 
processing (Failing et al., 2015; Lee & Shomstein, 2014; 
Maclean & Giesbrecht, 2015). Corroborating this finding, 
Le Pelley, Seabrooke, Kennedy, Pearson, & Most (2017) 
found that the negative effect of reward-related distractors 
was rather short-lived on a temporal attention task (but 
see Failing & Theeuwes, 2015). Based on these studies, one 
could speculate that reward-related distractors impede 
early cognitive processes, leading to misguided saccades. 
However, such early “disruptions” may have only limited 
effect on later processing stages, because people may be 
able to quickly correct for their impact.
Indeed, results from Experiment 1C seem consistent 
with the possibility that reward-related distractors rapidly 
capture visual attention, but do not affect later cognitive 
operations. In this version of our task, we increased the 
distance between target and distractor, assuming that 
this would increase the chance for visual attentional 
capture by the distractor associated with reward – thus 
maximizing the chance for reward-driven disruption. 
Surprisingly, this manipulation had no effect on how 
accurate participants were in high vs. no distractor reward 
conditions. Nevertheless, participants were somewhat 
slower on trials where a high (2210 ms) vs. no (2113 ms) 
reward-related distractor appeared. This effect was small 
(d = .29) and non-significant, so it should be interpreted 
with extreme caution. Still, based on this finding, one 
might speculate that although people showed misguided 
saccades to reward-related cues, they might have been 
able to overcome this initial shift (within 700 ms) as they 
were still able to respond accurately on the math task.
As we did not measure people’s gaze during our study, 
we cannot conform nor disconfirm the latter possibility, 
but we do feel this would be a promising future direction. 
Such a design—i.e., a design that combines eye tracking 
measures with math performance—would help to better 
understand whether optimal performance on the math 
task is still possible, even if attention is initially rapidly 
captured by reward-related distractors. Specifically, it 
would be informative to see what aspects of gaze behavior 
(e.g., whether the first fixation is on the distractor vs. 
the target; how quickly people can disengage from the 
distractor; whether people can avoid fixating on the 
distractor at all) is most likely to impair performance 
(Failing et al., 2015; Le Pelley et al., 2015).
Second, it is possible that reward-related distractors 
do impair cognitive processes beyond visual capture, but 
that our task was not sensitive to detecting such an effect. 
After inspecting the results, one may argue that our task 
was too easy; overall, participants were quite accurate 
(i.e., above 80%). Thus, even if participants were initially 
disrupted by reward-related distractors, they may have 
managed to protect goals from these interfering stimuli: 
they could quickly (i.e., within 700 ms) correct for this 
and apparently were still able to process the targets (e.g., 
8) and to perform mental operations on these targets 
(e.g., 9 + 8). In line with this explanation, exploratory 
findings revealed that perceived task difficulty was 
related to the susceptibility for reward-based distraction. 
Specifically, participants who thought that the task was 
more difficult, were slowed down more by high reward-
related distractors. This explanation is in line with previous 
research that shows that under high working memory 
load, people are more susceptible to distractions (for a 
review, see Lavie, 2010). Speculatively, future research 
should make the task more difficult (e.g., by increasing 
the pace), or take into account individual differences, such 
as working memory capacity (e.g., Anderson et al., 2011).
The potential lack of difficulty might also explain 
why our results are not in line with Krebs et al. (2011, 
2010), who reported that irrelevant-reward associations 
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interfere with conflict processing. For two reasons, the 
Stroop task used in Krebs’ studies is different from the 
current task. First, in the Stroop task, distractor colors 
are always associated with a competing response, so in 
those studies, distractor effects may reflect response 
interference, not just attentional capture. In our task, 
such response competition was absent, as participants 
never had to respond to the colors themselves. Second, 
in the Stroop task, the concept color is always task-
relevant, which makes ink colors difficult to strategically 
ignore. In our task, it may have been easier for people 
to categorically ignore the color dimension during the 
test phase, thus preventing distraction before it began. 
The latter issue could be addressed in future research, 
e.g., by introducing mini-blocks of learning and testing 
phases (e.g., Lee & Shomstein, 2014). Such a design 
could prevent people from strategically only focusing on 
numbers, not colors, thus making distractors even harder 
to ignore.
Third, although we found some indications that 
participants learned reward associations in the training 
phase (especially in Experiment 1B), these stimulus-
reward associations may have been too subtle to disrupt 
performance during the test phase. Indeed, our learning 
phase was different from most previous studies in this 
area in three ways. First, in previous studies, the learning 
phase often employed instrumental learning—where 
action towards a certain cue (e.g., finding a red circle) 
was directly associated with earning money. In our study, 
however, reward learning was arguably less instrumental in 
nature. Specifically, while stimuli (e.g., a blue X) predicted 
the availability of reward contingent on people’s action 
(indicating the correct order of the letters), people were 
never required to approach this cue, or actively search 
for it. Second, our training task required more focused 
attention, and perhaps greater working memory capacity, 
than learning tasks in prior studies (which often used 
visual search procedures). This strong attentional focus 
may have caused people to readily suppress task-irrelevant 
dimensions (in this case, color), impairing acquisition of 
stimulus-reward associations. Third, our training phase 
was shorter than training phases in previous studies (e.g., 
240 in Anderson et al., 2011), which may have given simply 
less time for participants to learn reward associations. We 
should note, though, there are existing studies that used 
training phases with less instrumental reward learning 
(Bucker & Theeuwes, 2016; Le Pelley et al., 2015; Pool et al., 
2014), more focused attention learning tasks (Anderson, 
2016b; Mine & Saiki, 2015) and shorter training sessions 
(e.g,. 144 trials in Sali et al., 2014); these prior studies have 
shown reward-based attentional capture in a test phase, 
suggesting that our learning phase, in principle, should be 
conducive to reward learning. We recommend that future 
studies use a more established reward learning procedure, 
to facilitate interpretation of results.
We further examined how different variations of our 
task affected performance in high vs. no distractor reward 
conditions. First, we introduced a random reward schedule 
in Experiment 1B (Skinner & Ferster, 2015; Thorndike, 
1898), but confirmatory results from Experiment 1B (80% 
random reward) were similar to those of Experiment 1A 
(100% reward). Second, we located the distractor further 
away from the target in Experiment 1C. In this version 
of the task, misguided saccades towards the distractor 
should have had the strongest detrimental effects for 
performance. Nevertheless, by contrast to mounting 
evidence from vision research (Anderson, 2016a; Failing 
& Theeuwes, 2017), we did not find evidence for such an 
effect. It could be that even if participants’ eye movements 
were initially captured by reward-related distractors, they 
could quickly disengage from these cues and still perform 
the math task well. To conclude, task variations did not 
influence the magnitude of disruption of performance by 
reward-related distractors.
Concluding remarks
In the current research, we found no evidence that reward-
related distractors harm performance during a mental 
arithmetic task. In our view, this finding is interesting as 
it contradicts findings from visual search tasks (but see 
Sha & Jiang, 2016), from conflict processing tasks (Krebs 
et al., 2011, 2010), and from our previous research on 
mental arithmetic tasks (Rusz et al., 2018). All in all, our 
research suggests that reward-related distractors may 
not harm performance on all types of tasks that require 
cognitive control.
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